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摘  要 
  I
摘  要 
家族企业活跃在世界各个角落，无论在哪里，家族企业都是一种重要的组织形式。












针对上述问题，本文选择了 2010-2014 年间首发上市的全部 A 股家族企业作为
研究样本，将家族企业按照 CEO 是否来自家族内部分为家族 CEO 企业与职业经理
人家族企业，研究两种家族企业的薪酬业绩敏感性。接着又将家族 CEO 企业按照




（2）相较于旁系 CEO 家族企业，直系 CEO 家族企业的薪酬业绩敏感性较低。职业
经理人、旁系 CEO 与直系 CEO 相比较，职业经理人担任 CEO 的家族企业薪酬业绩






















Family business located in every corner of the world. The family business is a 
major form of all organizations no matter where. Globally, 65% to 80% of the 
enterprises are owned or operated by a family. In the world's top 500 businesses, 
family businesses’ proportion reached four percent. With the development and 
expansion of the family business, the mode of operation and management of family 
businesses need to be more standardized and scientific. At this time the family 
business need to transform from a family-business model to a non-family-business 
model. And an effective way to solve this problem is to introduce professional 
managers. But after the introduction of professional managers, because of agency 
problems, family businesses need to encourage professional managers. 
In recent years, frequent executive astronomical salaries event attracted a large 
controversy in the community. At the beginning of the year 2015, the executive 
compensation regulations of state-owned key enterprises has made it clear that the 
linkage between performance and executive compensation is indispensable. Linking 
pay and performance is reflected in pay-for-performance sensitivity. Due to the 
special nature of the family businesses, family tends to have ownership and control of 
enterprises. When the family business’s CEO is hold by family members, family also 
holds the right to operate the business. Different nature of the family business CEO 
will lead enterprises to adopt different incentives, So whether the pay-for-performance 
sensitivity will be different? At the same time, how is the transformation from a 
family-business model to a non-family-business model effect? These problems are all 
worthy to study. 
For these problems, I choose non-financial family businesses from A-share listed 
firms in 2010-2014. Firstly, according to whether the CEO is from the family, I 
divided the family business into two parts. If CEO is from family, this kind of family 















firms. Then I divided family CEO firms into two parts. If the family CEO is lineal 
family member, this kind of family business is called lineal CEO firms. If the family 
CEO is collateral family member, this kind of family business is called collateral CEO 
firms. According to the above classification, I study how the types of CEO affect the 
CEO pay-for-performance sensitivity. Secondly, I choose the family business whose 
CEO type change from family CEO to professional CEO during the past five years, 
and compare the performance of family business after the introduction of professional 
managers. 
In this paper, I draw the following conclusions. Firstly, the professional CEO 
firms’ pay-for-performance sensitivity is higher than family CEO family firms’. 
Secondly, lineal CEO firms’ pay-for-performance sensitivity is higher than collateral 
CEO firms’. Finally, the performance of family business has a declining trend before 
it change to use professional managers. The family business has a better performance 
after than the year before it introduce professional managers, but the performance 
improvement is not obvious. But, overall, the performance after the introduction of 
professional managers is still lower than the overall level prior to the introduction. 
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至 2011 年，在美国有 550 万个家族企业，家族企业解决了全国 63%的就业问题，
创造的生产总值占全国 GDP 总额的 57%。根据美国学者克林•盖尔西克（Kelin 
E.Gersick，1998）[1]等人的研究，在全球，有 65% ~80%的企业由家庭所有或经




家族企业调查报告》[2]。报告显示：截至 2014 年 7 月底，A 股上市公司有 2528
家，其中民营企业有 1485 家，747 家是家族企业，家族企业占所有上市公司的






















表 1-1 部分国家家族企业占比情况 
国家 注册企业总数中家族企业占比 
美国  所占比重约为 59% 
意大利 所占比重达到 99% 
英国 75%的企业是家族企业 
加拿大 80%的企业是家族企业 
西班牙 在销售额≥200 万的企业中，家族企业占比超过 70% 
葡萄牙 所占比重约为 70% 
瑞士 家族企业比例占 85%—90% 
瑞典 所占比重达到 90% 
荷兰 74%的企业是家族企业 
德国 49%的企业由家族控制 
日本 在中小企业中，家族企业占比超过 95% 
拉美国家 在非国有企业中，家族企业占比 80%—98% 
资料来源：李前兵。家族企业成长中的契约变迁：理论与实证研究。经济科学出版社，2007。 
 













































成员担任分为两类：一类是由家族成员担任 CEO 的家族 CEO 企业，另外一类是
由职业经理人担任 CEO 的职业经理人家族企业。其次又将家族 CEO 企业按照
CEO 与实际控制人的关系远近分为两类：一类是 CEO 与实际控制人为直系亲属
关系的直系 CEO 家族企业，另外一类是 CEO 与实际控制人为旁系亲属关系的旁



























    家族企业作为发展迅速，并为国家生产总值、就业率、技术创新等方面做出
突出贡献的经济体，在 21 世纪出现了家族企业研究的热潮，并在 2006 年达到了
高峰。然而最近几年研究文献的数量呈现了下滑的趋势。对家族企业的研究仍需
进一步深入和扩大。 
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